State Teacher Policy Database Homepage › Florida › Policy Priority: Teacher Compensation

Performance Pay

Learn more about how Florida is performing on Performance Pay in the Teacher Compensation policy area.
Go to a policy lever Differentiated Pay for Hard-to-Staff Schools and Subjects Performance Pay Pay for Prior Work Experience
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Florida's Performance

Ungraded
NCTQ evaluates whether states are effectively using this policy lever by examining whether they require the use of performance when determining a teacher’s salary and whether they incentivize districts to incorporate performance into teacher pay. Explore the key actions below to learn more about how Florida is implementing Performance Pay policies.

Why does this matter?

Research demonstrates that performance-based teacher compensation is linked to improved student outcomes.1 Performance pay can be particularly effective in schools that struggle to retain qualified teachers. By rewarding high-performing educators, these schools incentivize top talent to stay, leading to improved student achievement.

Why does Florida stand out?

Florida explicitly requires districts to consider teacher performance and has a statewide initiative supporting performance pay.

In Florida, since July 2014, districts must use a performance-based salary schedule for new teachers, through which salary adjustments are granted in proportion to a teacher’s level of effectiveness; for example, new teachers as of 2014 who are effective must receive salary adjustments that are between 50% and 75% of the adjustments given to highly effective teachers, and teachers who do not reach any of those categories are not given salary adjustments. Districts have some flexibility in their measurement of teacher effectiveness, but they must meet certain requirements, such as a minimum of one third of the teacher’s rating based on indicators of student growth. Teachers who were employed by the district before performance-based salary adjustments were enacted have been able to choose to remain on the pre-2014 salary schedule.

What are the key actions Florida
should take?

    • See what these exemplars are doing in this policy area:

    Texas

    Key Resources

    State of the States 2022: Teacher Compensation Strategies

    Explore NCTQ’s detailed state analysis of teacher compensation strategies.

    Explore resource

    Smart Money 2.0

    Uncover teachers' salaries across 90 districts nationwide, learn about strategies to increase pay, and discover missed opportunities for raising compensation and improving outcomes.

    Explore resource

    More districts are paying teaches strategically to meet critical needs. Is yours?

    Learn more about how some districts are implementing differentiated compensation to fill critical gaps and improve student learning.

    Explore resource

    What are the long term effects of teacher performance pay on student outcomes?

    Read more about the research behind teacher performance pay.

    Explore resource
    References
    1. The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 87, Issue 5, October 2020, Pages 2322–2355, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa002
    2. Ladd, H. F., & Sorensen, L. C. (2017). Returns to teacher experience: Student achievement and motivation in middle school. Education Finance and Policy, 12(2), 241-279; Rivkin, S. G., Hanushek, E. A., & Kain, J. F. (2005). Teachers, schools, and academic achievement. Econometrica, 73(2), 417-458; Harris, D. N., & Sass, T. R. (2011). Teacher training, teacher quality and student achievement. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7-8), 798-812.